Thomas Metzinger suggests that the global neural correlate of consciousness (the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms sufficient for the occurrence of the mental states to which they are related (Wikipedia))
…is like an island emerging from the sea—as noted, it is a large set of neural properties underlying consciousness as a whole, underpinning your experiential model of the world in its totality at any given moment. The global NCC has many different levels of description: Dynamically, we can describe it as a coherent island, made of densely coupled relations of cause and effect, emerging from the waters of a much less coherent flow of neural activity. Or we could adopt a neurocomputational perspective and look at the global NCC as something that results from information-processing in the brain and hence functions as a carrier of information. At this point, it becomes something more abstract, which we might envision as an information cloud hovering above a neurobiological substrate. The “border” of this information cloud is functional, not physical; the cloud is physically realized by widely distributed firing neurons in your head. Just like a real cloud, which is made of tiny water droplets suspended in the air, the neuronal activation pattern underlying the totality of your conscious experience is made of millions of tiny electrical discharges and chemical transitions at the synapses. In strict terms, it has no fixed location in the brain, though it is coherent.
Thomas Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self
Now this is, as Metzinger would be the first to admit, highly abstract language to describe the warm, luminous immediacy that is the lived experience of phenomena. The scent of a lover’s hair, the golden light of sunset, damp air on the skin at dawn – an information cloud hovering above a neurobiological substrate? And yet how else could one experience these things?
Oddly enough, for me at least, Metzinger’s technical language comes closer to expressing what might be thought of as one’s soul than any Cartesian plug-in ghost. The beautiful world that is our necessary home is as much the gift of who we are as it is a place “out there”; we are not, and never have been, visitors. Like everything else, we are just what causality does: “the self is but one of the countless manifestations of the Tao. It is an extension of the cosmos.” (David Y F Ho (PDF))

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Nobody knows, least of all Materialists like Metzinger, the Churchlands, the late Dan Dennett and co., how a lump of matter in our skulls can elicit feelings associated with the ‘scent of a lover’s hair, the golden light of sunset, damp air on the skin at dawn’. They arrogantly reduce it to ‘folk psychology’. Joseph Levine, David Chalmers and William James (way back in 1890) and many others since, have all recognised this as an ‘epistemic gap’. Metzinger and co. still don’t mind the ‘gap’. Galen Strawson, as well as J-P Sartre, strongly criticises Materialist eliminative physicalism, as do Henry Stapp (1999) and Merlin Donald, in whose A Mind So Rare we read, ‘the subjective world of the mind can be viewed only from consciousness.’ (p. 13): https://archive.org/details/mindsorareevolut0000dona_d4h8>. The Materialist road, like Quaker non-theism, is a dead-end.
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Thanks, Gerard. That is a very good line from Merlin Donald – I shall have to follow your link and read more.
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Yes, that is interesting. The odd thing about Metzinger is that I don’t read him as an epiphenomenalist – I think he’d probably agree with (at least that sentence from) Merlin Donald. The point of the brain – evolutionarily and experientially – is the consciousness that it enables.
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